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USURY - NUISANCES - INJUNCTIONS - REPEATED VIOLATIONS OF
THE UsuRY LAws ENJOINABLE AS PUBLIC NUISANCE - The defendant
conducted a small loan office which advertised extensively in the community.
The loans ranged from $5 to $50 in amount, and were originally made for
terms ranging from one to six months. The borrowers were predominantly
wage earners and they were required to give promissory notes far in excess of
the sums received. The interest rates of 590 loans made by the defendant
averaged well over three hundred per cent per annum, making the business
almost exclusively usurious. The Minnesota statute set the maximum interest
rate at six per cent with a provision allowing a maximum of eight per cent
for agreements that had been put in writing. No express criminal penalties
were provided. Payments in excess of the statutory maximum were recoverable at the suit of the borrower but half of the recovery was alloted to the
county school fund. Courts were also empowered by statute to declare void
and cancel any contract with interest provided for in excess of the maximum
rate. Held, that the violations of the usury laws constituted a public nuisance
and were properly enjoined as such; and further, that the appointment of a
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receiver for the assets and business premises of the defendant was justified.
State ex rel. Goff v. O'Neil, (Minn. 1939) 286 N. W. 316.
The earliest decisions employing the public nuisance concept for judicial
restriction of usurious small loans justified the result by describing the place
where the business was conducted as a disorderly house.1 But historically it
would seem that a particular location is not an essential requirement of public
nuisance. 2 In 1929 the $upreme Court of Kansas abandoned this artificial
doctrine and approved a broad injunction against exacting excessive interest
in small loans to necessitous persons. 3 The same result has been reached in
Kentucky, though the Kentucky court was reluctant to class the offense
strictly as a public nuisance.4 The trend in modern equity has been to expand
the public nuisance concept so as to include injury to broad social interests. 5
The decision here seems to rest upon the proposition that usury, under the
circumstances attending the principal case, constitutes a public nuisance at
common law, although the court was aided in its argument by a statute which
defined a public nuisance, for purposes of the criminal law, as any conduct
which "shall annoy, injure, or endanger the safety, health, comfort, or repose
of any considerable number of persons." 6 It would seem that authority for
classifying the loan shark as a public nuisance, irrespective of statute, may be
found by reference to cases in related fields. 7 The court's arguments as to the
1 State v. Diamant, 73 N. J. L. 131, 62 A. 286 (1905); State v. Martin, 77
N. J. L. 652, 73 A. 548, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 507, 134 Am St. Rep. 814 at 819, 18
Ann. Cas. 986 at 988 (1909), cited approvingly in Commonwealth v. Donoghue,
250 Ky. 343, 63 S. W. (2d) 3 (1933) (indictment at common law for conspiracy to
take usury).
2 Wooo, NUISANCES, 3d ed., § 51 et seq. (1893), cites a long list of common
nuisances, not intimately connected with property rights or a definite location, e.g.,
common scold, eavesdropper, selling obscene picture books.
8 State ex rel. v. McMahon, 128 Kan. 772, 280 P. 906, 66 A. L. R. 1072
at 1078 (1929), approved in State ex rel. Beck v. Basham, 146 Kan. 181, 70 P.
(2d) 24 (1937). The following cases have frequently been cited contra: Commonwealth v. Mutual Loan & Trust Co., 156 Ky. 299, 160 S. W. 1042, 50 L. R. A.
{N. S.) u71 (1913); People v. Seccombe, 103 Cal. App. 306, 284 P. 725 (1930);
and Means v. State, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 75 S. W. (2d) 953. Attempts were
made to distinguish them in State ex rel. McMahon, 128 Kan. 772, 280 P. 906
(1929) and in the principal case.
4 Commonwealth ex rel. Grauman v. Continental Co., Inc., 275 Ky. 238, 121
S. W. (2d) 49 (1938).
5 Cases are cited in WALSH, EQUITY, § 39 (1930), entitled "Protection of
social rights in equity."
6 Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927), § 10241.
7 Particularly applicable would seem to be the public health and morals cases
cited in WALSH, EQUITY, § 39 (1930); Stead v. Fortner, 255 Ill. 468, 92 N. E.
680 (1912), and those to be found in Wooo, Nu1SANCEs, 3d ed., § 51 et seq.
(1893). But see Mack, "The Revival of Criminal Equity," 16 HARV. L. REv. 389
(1903), where the modern cases expanding the public nuisance concept have been
violently attacked as setting dangerous precedents for the denial of a jury trial to one
accused of crime. See also Caldwell, "Injunctions against Crime," 26 ILL. L. REV.
259 (1931).
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inadequacy of the legal remedy against the defendant are persuasive. First,
no express criminal penalties are provided in the statute; second, the extreme
poverty of the borrower precludes the hiring of an attorney to pursue his
statutory civil remedy; and third, the refusal of the borrower to pay excessive
interest charges may lead to wage garnishments which would imperil his job.
On the other hand, attempts by courts to regulate the small loan business by
a case-to-case procedure raise serious questions of policy and practicability.
The research of the Russell Sage Foundation has shown that the usual statutory limitations of six per cent and eight per cent per annum are far too low
to make the average small loan a profitable investment for lenders. 8 Difficulties
may arise when a court attempts to establish a point at which the rates of
interest charged by any one operator become so unconscionable as to constitute him a public nuisance. 9 Risk calculations developed in other types of
commercial loans cannot be carried over into the small loan field. Careful
scrutiny of every loan made by a particular lender would be required to determine whether interest charges were excessive in view of the credit standing
and economic resources of each borrower. If the court should feel constrained
by legislative enactment to declare all interest charges above eight per cent per
annum excessive, such a policy might have the effect of driving even honest
lenders out of business, and of leaving the needy borrower in a worse situation
than before. Numerous state legislatures have for many years been carrying on
experiments in small loan regulation by means of licensing provisions under the
Uniform Small Loan Act or statutes similar thereto.10 Already in Minnesota
voluntary licensing provisions are in effect.11 The impracticability of extensive
judicial regulation of the small loan problem on a public nuisance basis seems
to indicate that the field is one in which legislative rather than judicial action
is required. In the principal case the exactions of interest by the defendant
were so excessive and the consequences so widespread that intervention by some
kind of official agency was urgently required. It may be conceded that in some
areas courts may proceed in advance of legislatures in an effort to protect
broader social interests. Nevertheless a serious question remains, whether the
small loan field is one in which courts are adequately equipped either for the
formulation of new standards or the development of an adequate administrative
machinery.
8
RoBINSON and NUGENT, REGULATION OF THE SMALL LoAN BusINESs 87 (1935).
9 RYAN, UsuRY AND UsuRY LAWS (1924). See especially p. 77, where the
difficulties of defining and isolating cases of "moral usury" are treated from the legislative angle. A court would find itself confronted with equally baffling problems.
10
ROBINSON and NUGENT, REGULATION OF THE SMALL LOAN Bus1NESS I I 8
et seq. (1935).
11
Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927), §§ 7042, 7043.

